14
reports, two European women passengers had been carried off. That evening, the Admiral Commander-in-chief telegraphed :
"I have sanctioned parties being landed in Chinese territory if necessary and consider, in view of frequent use of Bias Bay as base for piracies, including French steamer Hanoi' on the 12th November, that action may be necessary to destroy pirate village in Bias Bay (a) if women not recovered and Hong Kong police officials recommend it as the only course to enforce their being surrendered, or (b) if it can be proved from pirates already caught that pirates belong to one special village.
*
This action was approved by His Majesty's Government on the 17th November. But on the same day a further telegram was received from the Commander-in-chief
as follows:-
៩
Prisoners state pirate gang consisted of twenty-two men. Reports received up to present are somewhat conflicting, but it appears probable practically all pirates have been accounted for, and that only person missing is passenger who is half-caste British subject, possibly killed or drowned. Naval units have been recalled to Hong Kong.
The immediate and pressing question of the rescue of the "Sunning's passengers has therefore solved itself without necessitating a landing on Chinese territory a proposal which, in view of the excited condition of China, was regarded at the Foreign Office with some alarm.
The general question as to how to deal with the Bias Bay pirates, however, remains. It is now before the Committee of Imperial Defence to decide whether the proposed warning should be addressed to the Canton Government, and, if this warning (as is probable) produces no results, what practical plan of action should be laid down. But before that plan is carried out, the Foreign Office wish to be consulted again as to whether the time and the action are opportune.
Foreign Office, November 23, 1926.
0
V. WELLESLEY.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government,[
Printed for the Cabinet. November 1926,
CONFIDENTIAL.
CP. 380 (26).
MEMORANDUM.
BRITISH POLICY IN CHINA.
F 4793/1/10
10
THE following memorandum is a continuation of the memorandum for the Cabinet, C.P. 308 (26), which consists of three memoranda, dated the 2nd February, 1926, the 19th July, 1926, and the 30th July, 1926, the whole forming a continuous exposition of British policy towards China, having special relation to the problems raised by the Tariff Conference. At the risk of recapitulating much of what appears in these three memoranda it will facilitate a complete understanding of the present position if the present memorandum begins with a brief summary of the course of the Tariff Conference.
loans debt.
15
II.
The Washington Conference in 1921 decided that China should be allowed to levy a surtax of 24 per cent. ad valorem on foreign imports (5 per cent. on luxuries) as from such date, for such purposes and subject to such conditions as the present Tariff Conference might determine." In the course of the discussions in the sub-committee at Washington the Japanese delegate, under instructions from his Government, read a statement which he was not at liberty to discuss: It is hoped that the countries interested will adopt a practical arrangement whereby the proper use in future of the additional customs revenue will be assured. In our opinion, the additional revenue should first be used for the service of the foreign by which, of course, was meant the consolidation of the unsecured
British policy with regard to these Washington surtaxes aimed at securing guarantees that something substantial should be accomplished of constructive benefit to China, in particular, for example, the abolition of li-kin. We deprecated turning the Tariff Conference into a debt collecting commission, and we were supported by the American Government in the view that the question of the consolidation of the unsecured debt should be entirely eliminated from the agenda of the conference. At a later stage we were gradually forced into the position of recognising that, in order to secure support for our constructive policy, it might be necessary to make some concession to those Powers who were only anxious about their debts,
III.
When the Tariff Conference opened Sir R. Macleay assured us that consolidation of the unsecured debt was regarded by every Power represented, including China herself, as one of the main objects which the conference had to accomplish, and that we could not afford to stand out alone, as we should be accused of trying to wreck the conference and thereby reap much odium all round. Accordingly, we reluctantly consented to join in the attempt to elaborate a scheme for the consolidation of the unsecured debt.
IV.
In the meantime the Chinese demand for full tariff autonomy had become more and more violent and insistent, especially after the Shanghai incident of the 30th May, when a wave of nationalism, violently hostile to Great Britain, swept the country from end to end. At this stage our policy was in very close harmony with that of both America and Japan. We agreed that China's right to tariff autonomy should be recognised in principle, but that tariff autonomy should only be granted gradually and by stages. We desired to implement the promises made at Washington, and we were willing that the scope of the conference should be enlarged so as to permit, if
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